Central bank independence and the value of ambiguity: a reputational game between a Central Bank, the government, and commercial banks

Gangopadhayay, Partha

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Central bank independence and the value of ambiguity: a reputational game between a Central Bank, the government, and commercial banks

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Gangopadhayay, Partha
Varoufakis, Yanis

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Central bank independence and the value of ambiguity: a reputational game between a Central Bank, the government, and commercial banks / P. Gangopadhayay and Yanis Varoufakis

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INGLESE

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Risorse locali BiblioSar

CAG0398961

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https://opac.regione.sardegna.it/SebinaOpac/resource/CAG0398961

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